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Abstract 
Background: Rapid identification and investigation of healthcare-associated infections (HCAIs) 
is important for suppression of SARS-CoV-2, but the infection source for hospital onset COVID-
19 infections (HOCIs) cannot always be readily identified based only on epidemiological data. 
Viral sequencing data provides additional information regarding potential transmission clusters, 
but the low mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2 can make interpretation using standard phylogenetic 
methods difficult. 
 
Methods: We developed a novel statistical method and sequence reporting tool (SRT) that 
combines epidemiological and sequence data in order to provide a rapid assessment of the 
probability of HCAI among HOCI cases (defined as first positive test >48 hours following 
admission) and to identify infections that could plausibly constitute outbreak events. The method 
is designed for prospective use, but was validated using retrospective datasets from hospitals in 
Glasgow and Sheffield collected February-May 2020. 
 
Results: We analysed data from 326 HOCIs. Among HOCIs with time-from-admission ≥8 days 
the SRT algorithm identified close sequence matches from the same ward for 160/244 (65.6%) 
and in the remainder 68/84 (81.0%) had at least one similar sequence elsewhere in the hospital, 
resulting in high estimated probabilities of within-ward and within-hospital transmission. For 
HOCIs with time-from-admission 3-7 days, the SRT probability of healthcare acquisition was 
>0.5 in 33/82 (40.2%). 
 
Conclusions: The methodology developed can provide rapid feedback on HOCIs that could be 
useful for infection prevention and control teams, and warrants further prospective evaluation. 
The integration of epidemiological and sequence data is important given the low mutation rate of 
SARS-CoV-2 and its variable incubation period. 
 
Abstract word count: 250 
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Introduction 
Nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 presents a significant health risk to both vulnerable 
patients and to healthcare workers (HCWs)[1-5]. There is a variable incubation period, extending 
up to day 14 from exposure to the virus in symptomatic cases[6]. It is also known that 
transmission is possible from asymptomatic or presymptomatic carriers[7-10], complicating 
identification of hospital-acquisition among hospital onset COVID-19 infections (HOCIs) and 
tracing of likely sources of infection.  
  
There is now substantial evidence from retrospective studies that genome sequencing of 
epidemic viruses, together with standard infection prevention and control (IPC) practice, better 
excludes nosocomial transmissions and better identifies routes of transmission than IPC 
investigation alone[11-13]. The development of rapid sequencing methods capable of  generating 
pathogen genomes within 24-48 hours has recently created the potential for clinical IPC 
decisions to be informed by genetic data in near-real-time[14]. Although SARS-CoV-2 has a low 
mutation rate, estimated at around 2 changes per genome per month[15], sufficient viral diversity 
does now exist for viral sequences to provide information regarding potential transmission 
clusters[16]. However, phylogenetic methods alone cannot reliably identify linked infections or the 
direction of transmission, and the need for clinical teams to gather additional patient data 
presents challenges to the timely interpretation of SARS-CoV-2 sequence data. 
 
To overcome these barriers, we have developed a sequence reporting tool (SRT) that integrates 
genomic and epidemiological data from HOCIs to rapidly identify closely matched sequences 
within the hospital and assign a probability estimate for nosocomial infection. The output report 
is designed for prospective use to reduce the delay from SARS-CoV-2 sequencing to 
application of insights generated to IPC practice. As such, the probability model on which it is 
based has minimal computational requirements or need for local tuning and checking of model 
parameters. The work was conducted as part of the COVID-19 Genomics (COG) UK initiative, 
which sequences large numbers of SARS-CoV-2 viruses from hospitals and the community 
across the UK[17]. Here we describe the performance of the SRT using COG-UK sequence data 
for HOCI cases collected from Glasgow and Sheffield between February and May 2020 and 
explore how it may have provided additional useful information for IPC investigations. 
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Methods 
The SRT methodology is applied to HOCI cases, defined here as inpatients with first positive 
SARS-CoV-2 test or symptom onset >48 hours after admission, who were not suspected of 
having COVID-19 at admission. The SRT algorithm returns probability estimates for healthcare-
associated infection (HCAI) in each HOCI case, i.e. the probability that they acquired their 
infection post-admission within the hospital, with information provided on closely matching viral 
sequences from the ward location at sampling and wider hospital. Results for individual HOCIs 
are evaluated in relation to the IPC classification system recommended by PHE and other UK 
public health bodies, based on interval from admission to positive test: 3-7 days post admission 
= indeterminate HCAI; 8-14 days post admission = probable HCAI; >14 days post admission = 
definite HCAI[18]. We also applied the PHE definition of healthcare-associated COVID-19 
outbreaks[18] (i.e. ≥2 cases associated with a specific ward, with at least one being a probable or 
definite HCAI) to ward-level data, and within each PHE-defined outbreak event we evaluated 
whether there was one or more clearly distinct genetic cluster. This was determined by 
consecutive linkage of each HOCI into clusters using a 2 SNP threshold (with HOCIs assigned 
to a genetic cluster if they were a sequence match to any member). Sequences with <90% 
genomic coverage were excluded from all analyses. 
 
Data collection and processing 
Research Ethics for COG-UK was granted by the PHE Research Ethics and Governance group 
as part of the emergency response to COVID-19 (24 April 2020, REF: R&D NR0195). 
 
Glasgow 
During the first wave of SARS-CoV-2, the MRC-University of Glasgow Centre for Virus 
Research collected residual clinical samples from SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals following 
diagnosis at the West of Scotland Specialist Virology Centre. Samples were triaged for rapid 
sequencing using Oxford Nanopore Technologies (ONT) for suspected healthcare related 
infections or Illumina sequencing in all other cases (details in supplementary Appendix). 
 
Sheffield 
Residual clinical samples from SARS-CoV-2 positive cases diagnosed at Sheffield Teaching 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust were sequenced at the University of Sheffield using ARTIC 
network protocol[19] and ONT. Throughout the epidemic, members of the IPC team were notified 
by the laboratory and by clinical teams of positive results and reviewed relevant areas to ensure 
optimisation of practice and appropriate management of patients. Electronic reports were 
created contemporaneously, including an assessment as to whether suspected linked cases 
were present based on ward level epidemiology. As part of SRT validation, these reports were 
accessed retrospectively by a study team member blind to the sequencing data and each 
included HOCI case was defined as being thought unlinked to other cases, a presumed index 
case in an outbreak or a presumed secondary case. 
 
 
HOCI classification algorithm 
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The sequence matching and probability score algorithm is run separately for each ‘focus 
sequence’ corresponding to a HOCI. We use associated metadata to assign other previously 
collected sequences to categories representing where the individual may be part of a SARS-
COV-2 transmission network: 
● Unit reference set: individual could be involved with transmission on same unit 
(ward/ICU etc) as focus sequence (look-back interval: 3 weeks) 
● Institution reference set: individual could be involved with transmission in same 
institution/hospital as focus sequence (look-back interval: 3 weeks) 
● Community reference set: individual could be involved with transmission outside of focus 
sequence institution (look-back interval: 6 weeks). 
It is possible for samples to be members of multiple reference sets. For example an outpatient 
may be involved in SARS-CoV-2 transmission at the institution they attended and/or in 
community transmission.  
 
For each run of the algorithm, pairwise comparisons are conducted between the focus 
sequence and each sequence within the unit reference set, institution reference set and 
community reference set. A reference set sequence is considered a close match to the focus 
sequence if there is a maximum of two SNP differences between them. This choice was based 
on reported healthcare-associated outbreak events[14, 20] and the overall mutation rate of SARS-
CoV-2 (details in supplementary Appendix). 
 
Probability calculations 
We use an expression of Bayes theorem to estimate probabilities for post-admission infection of 
each focus case divided by exposure on the unit, within the rest of the institution and from 
visitors (if they were allowed). An estimate of the prior probability (Pprior) of post-admission 
infection for each focus case is modified to a posterior probability according to information 
provided by the sequence data. The algorithm is based on sound statistical principles, but 
involves heuristic approximations. 
 
In symptomatic focus cases we base Pprior on the time interval (t) from admission to date of 
symptom onset or first positive test (if date of symptom onset not recorded). We calculate Pprior= 
F(t), where F() is the cumulative distribution function of incubation times[6]. The derivation of this 
method is given in the supplementary appendix. 
 
In theory, it would be optimal to use all of the information in the exact sequences observed. 
However, with the goal of constructing a computationally simple algorithm, we base our 
calculations on the probability of observing a similar sequence (within 2 SNPs) to that actually 
observed for each focus case conditional on each potential infection source/location. We require 
estimates of the probability of observing a similar sequence to the focus sequence conditional 
on infection in the community, current unit/ward or elsewhere in the hospital/institution, or from a 
visitor. For the unit and hospital, we estimate this using the observed sequence match 
proportion (on pairwise comparison to the focus sequence) in the unit reference set and 
institution reference set, respectively. For community- or visitor-acquired infection we use a 
weighted proportion of matching sequences in the community reference set, with weightings 
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determined by a calibration model that describes geographic clustering of similar sequences 
among community-acquired infections (described in supplementary appendix). The geographic 
weighting model was fitted separately for each study site using sequences strongly thought to 
represent community-acquired infection: all community-sampled sequences and patients 




The analysis was conducted in R (v. 4.0.2, R Foundation, Vienna), using sequence processing 
and comparison functions from ape (v5.4) and geospatial functions in the PostcodesioR (v0.1.1) 
and gmt packages (v2,0). The algorithm has also been implemented as a standalone SRT for 
prospective use[21] within COV-GLUE[22]. 
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The Glasgow dataset included 1199 viral sequences (available as of 23rd June 2020): 426 of 
which were derived from community sampling sites, 351 from patients presenting to the 
Emergency Department or hospital assessment locations such as acute medical units, 398 from 
hospital inpatients and 24 from outpatients. Limited data were available regarding the total 
number of HCWs testing positive and identification of their samples amongst those from the 
community-sampling sites, but 15 sequences were recorded as having been obtained from 
HCWs. The first positive test dates ranged from 3rd March to 27th May 2020. All consensus 
sequences had genomic coverage >90%. 
 
We applied the SRT algorithm to data from three hospitals with the required metadata available, 
for which 128/246 inpatient cases with sequences were HOCIs. Two of these patients had been 
transferred from another hospital within 14 days prior to their positive test and were not 
processed as focus sequences. One patient for whom we were unable to determine the exact 
sampling location within the hospital was also excluded, leaving 125 HOCI cases for analysis. 
Population sequencing coverage was 536/1578 (34.0%) overall for patients at the three 




The Sheffield dataset included 1630 viral sequences with accompanying metadata (available as 
of 10th October 2020): 714 were from inpatients, 117 were from outpatients and 799 were from 
HCWs. For the purpose of the retrospective evaluation, the 447/714 inpatient samples taken on 
date of admission were assumed to represent community-onset cases and used to calibrate the 
model. The first positive test dates ranged from 23rd February to 30th May 2020. One sequence 
with genome coverage <90% was dropped from further analysis (from an inpatient on date of 
admission). 201 of the inpatients were HOCIs. Population sequencing coverage was 714/977 
(73.1%) overall for inpatients, 201/261 (77.0%) for HOCIs specifically and 799/962 (83.1%) for 
HCWs. 
 
Comparison to standard PHE classification 
The SRT algorithm results in comparison to standard PHE classifications are summarised in 
Figure 1 and Table 1. The majority of HOCI cases in Glasgow (78/125, 62.4%) and over a third 
of those in Sheffield (71/201, 35.3%) met the PHE definition of a definite HCAI and so are 
known to have acquired the virus post-admission irrespective of sequencing results. The 
probable HCAI cases formed the next largest group at each site. Overall, the SRT algorithm 
identified close sequence matches from the same ward for 66.4% of definite and 64.2% of 
probable HCAIs, indicating likely within-ward transmission (examples provided in Case Studies 
1-3). When one or more close sequence matches was identified on the ward of the focus 
sequence, the SRT probability of infection on the ward was >0.5 in 185/189 cases (Figure 2). 
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For indeterminate HCAIs the SRT probability of HCAI was >0.5 in 33/82 (40.2%), and in 27/33 
(81.8%) cases a close sequence match on the ward was present. Overall, 14/125 (11.2%) 
HOCIs in Glasgow and 175/201 (87.1%) in Sheffield had at least one close sequence match to 
a HCW sample, reflecting the much greater availability of sequences from HCWs in the 
Sheffield dataset. 
 
In 16/244 (6.6%) cases that met the probable or definite HCAI definitions, there was no 
sequence match within the hospital; this is likely due to incomplete sequence data from SARS-
CoV-2 hospitalised cases and staff (with population sequencing coverage <40% patients and 
very limited for staff from Glasgow and ≈75% of patients and staff in Sheffield) and the presence 
of undiagnosed carriers. To reflect this we designed the SRT report to return the following 
message in such situations “This is a probable/definite HCAI based on admission date, but we 
have not found genetic evidence of transmission within the hospital”. There were 26 HOCIs in 
the Sheffield dataset for whom it was recorded that visitors were allowed on the ward at time of 
sampling. In three of these the estimated probability of infection from a visitor was between 0.4 
and 0.5 (all had ≥18 days from admission to diagnosis and no close sequence matches on the 
ward).  
 
Within the Sheffield dataset we identified six wards with two genetically distinct outbreak 
clusters (of two or more patients) and three wards with three distinct outbreaks (see Case Study 
3). Standard IPC assessment had classified each as a single outbreak. We also identified 10 
and 44 HOCIs in the Glasgow and Sheffield datasets, respectively, with no apparent genetic 
linkage to other HOCI cases on the ward but who met the PHE definition of inclusion within an 
outbreak event (Table 2). There were two HOCIs in the Sheffield dataset which showed a close 
sequence match to another case on the same ward with interval from admission to sample date 
≤2 days.
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Comparison to local IPC conclusions in Sheffield 
Detailed contemporaneous notes collected by IPC teams in Sheffield classified 18/201 HOCIs 
as the index case in outbreaks. IPC staff defined an index case as the first detected in an 
environment regardless of prior inpatient stay and, correspondingly, of these 14/18 were the first 
sequence on their ward and one was the second (the first 1 day earlier from a different bay on 
the ward was also recorded as an index case, and IPC staff deemed a ward outbreak with 
unclear index or possibly 2 index cases). Of the 18 index cases 11 showed at least one 
subsequent close sequence match on the same ward (the 2 index cases on a single ward were 
not genetically similar, and for 1/18 there were no subsequent sequences from the ward). The 
median SRT probability of HCAI was 0.70 (IQR 0.22-1.00, range 0.04-1, >0.5 in 12/18).  
 
A further 144/201 HOCIs were classified as being part of local outbreaks, and among these the 
median SRT probability of HCAI was 0.98 (IQR 0.89-1.00; range 0.02-1.00; >0.5 in 129/144) 
with one or more close sequence match on the same ward in 104/144. The remaining 39/201 
HOCIs, including 10 that were not recorded as HOCIs at the time, were classified by the IPC 
teams as not being part of local outbreaks). Among these the median SRT probability of HCAI 
was 0.74 (IQR 0.23-0.99, range 0.02-1.00; >0.5 in 23/39), with one or more close sequence 
matches on the same ward in 7/39. 
 
Case Study 1 
Figure 3 shows a phylogenetic tree of eight HOCIs within a single ward at a Glasgow hospital 
(Hospital 5, Unit 93), alongside associated meta-data and SRT probability outputs. The first 
HOCI detected (UID0032) was transferred from another hospital within the previous 2 weeks 
and so SRT output was not generated. All subsequent HOCIs return close sequence matches to 
at least one prior case on the ward, leading to SRT probability estimates of ward-acquired 
infection >0.9, even for UID0017 (an indeterminate HCAI). The phylogenetic tree indicates 
UID0032 has a SNP lacked by most of the cases identified on the ward, and therefore did not 
seed all of the cases in the outbreak cluster. Also shown on the tree is a single HOCI from a 
different ward in the same hospital (UID0025); this individual was an indeterminate HCAI, but a 
higher proportion of similar viral sequences within the hospital in comparison to their local 
community led to a SRT result of probable hospital-acquired infection. 
 
Case Study 2 
Figure 4 shows a phylogenetic tree indicating complex transmission networks across multiple 
hospitals in the Glasgow area (with SRT outputs for Hospitals 2 and 4). A monophyletic cluster 
of HOCIs can be seen in Hospital 2 Unit 48, with the first detected case identified by the SRT as 
a hospital-acquired and the rest unit-acquired infections. A paraphyletic group of HOCIs was 
detected in Hospital 4 Unit 69. Patient 1 (UID0042) was screened for COVID in Unit 69 on 
14.04.20 after developing a cough and oxygen requirement. The patient was moved from the 
nightingale area to a single room on the ward on 14.04.20 and was confirmed positive on 
15.04.20. 
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On 20.04.20 a second patient on Unit 69 (not sequenced) was screened after developing a 
cough and pyrexia and confirmed positive on 21.04.2020. The patient was in a single room at 
the time of symptom onset, however they had been in the main nightingale ward opposite 
patient 1 for 5 days. At this point 13 asymptomatic contacts in Unit 69 were screened, and 8 
(UID0043, UID0073, UID0041, UID0095, UID0116, UID0094, UID0083, UID0121) were positive. 
These cases are all identified as hospital-acquired or unit-acquired infections and can be 
grouped into a genetically similar cluster with a maximum pairwise distance of 2 SNPs between 
each member and its nearest neighbour. However, this cluster clearly represents multiple 
introductions of SARS-CoV-2 onto the ward.  
 
Case Study 3 
Figure 5 shows phylogenetic trees relating to three distinct viral lineages identified on a single 
ward in the Sheffield dataset (classified by contemporaneous IPC investigation as a single 
outbreak). Two of these lineages also include sequences from inpatients sampled from other 
wards within the same hospital. Detailed ward movement data highlighted additional possible 
links between patients in the B.2.1 cluster. Both UID0149 and UID0157 were present at 
LOC0111 prior to their sample dates.  
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Discussion 
We have developed a novel approach for identification and investigation of hospital-acquired 
SARS-CoV-2 infections combining epidemiological and sequencing data, designed to provide 
rapid and concise feedback to IPC teams working to prevent nosocomial transmission. Through 
retrospective application to clinical datasets, we have demonstrated that the methodology is 
able to provide confirmatory evidence for most PHE-defined definite and probable HCAIs and 
provide further information regarding indeterminate HCAIs. Thus the SRT may allow IPC teams 
to optimise their use of resources, concentrating audit, review and educational interventions on 
areas with likely nosocomial acquisition events.  
 
While the SRT is not likely to change IPC conclusions in cases meeting the definition of ‘definite’ 
or ‘probable’ HCAI based on interval from admission to symptom onset, in 91% of cases it did 
identify patients in the same ward or elsewhere in the hospital who could plausibly be linked to 
the HOCI within a single outbreak event. Those definite and probable HOCIs without close 
sequence matches are likely to reflect transmission from sources within the hospital that have 
either not been diagnosed or who were diagnosed without viral sequencing. In such cases it is 
impossible to calculate a probability of transmission and the SRT will simply state that no 
sequence matches were found within the hospital. 
 
For cases meeting the definition of ‘indeterminate healthcare associated’, the probability scores 
returned would be useful for IPC teams. These probabilities are dependent on comparison to 
sequences from cases of community-acquired infection obtained either from direct community 
sampling or from patients sampled at admission. The Sheffield dataset was lacking the former 
data source, but the SRT nonetheless classified a similar proportion of ‘indeterminate 
healthcare associated’ HOCIs as community-acquired infections to that found in the Glasgow 
dataset (approximately 60%). 
 
Current PHE guidelines define healthcare-associated COVID-19 outbreaks as two or more 
cases associated with a specific setting (e.g. ward), with at least one case having illness onset 
after 8 days of admission[18]. However, the guidelines note that “investigations of healthcare 
associated SARS-CoV-2 infection should also take into account COVID-19 cases categorised 
as ‘indeterminate healthcare associated’ (i.e. onset 3-7 days after admission), for which our 
SRT output would be useful. In most HOCIs meeting this definition of inclusion within an 
outbreak event, we found evidence of clusters of similar viral sequences located on the ward 
concerned, and the SRT results were in line with available local IPC classifications in the 
majority of cases. However, a substantial minority (54/279) of HOCIs although assumed to be 
part of a ward outbreak, were, in fact, isolated cases for which the sequencing data refuted 
genetic linkage to other sequences from the ward. The SRT also provided evidence of wards 
where IPC-defined outbreak events comprised two or three clearly distinct viral lineages (Case 
Report 3). 
 
The retrospective datasets analysed in this study represent the first few months of the COVID-
19 epidemic in the UK, and nosocomial transmission of the virus in the UK during this period 
has previously been reported at multiple sites[14, 23, 24]. HCWs were at increased risk of infection 
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and adverse health outcomes[1, 2, 4, 5, 25] and could have been important drivers of nosocomial 
transmission[8]. Data were limited for Glasgow but the Sheffield dataset contained a large 
number of sequences obtained from HCWs, with population sequencing coverage for this group 
>80%, and there was a close sequence match to at least one HCW observed for 87% of HOCIs. 
Our analysis has not evaluated direction of transmission to or from HCWs, but they were clearly 
linked into transmission networks within the hospital. A limitation of the current SRT approach 
and of the retrospective data available is that they do not include detailed information regarding 
work locations for HCWs. However, prospective use of the SRT would allow IPC teams to 
investigate linkage from a HOCI to any HCWs flagged as having a close sequence match. 
 
While a phylogenetic approach is useful in excluding direct transmission between cases, it can 
be more problematic to confirm transmission source[26]. Phylogenetic models can evaluate the 
full genetic information provided by viral sequence data, but there are challenges in 
incorporating and summarising associated patient meta-data in a timely fashion[27]. There will be 
cases in which phylogenetic analysis would provide information beyond that returned by the 
SRT. However, fully integrated epidemiological and phylogenetic analysis of hospital outbreaks 
is resource-intensive, presenting challenges in delivering the rapid turnaround and scale-up 
required to provide clear feedback to hospital IPC teams outside of research-intensive settings. 
 
Comparison of SRT output to phylogenetic trees in a number of test cases suggested that some 
clusters of genetically similar cases identified within a specific ward likely represented more than 
one transmission event onto the ward from similar viral lineages circulating within the healthcare 
system. Whilst monophyletic clusters associated with a single location are easier to interpret, we 
consider the presence of viruses within a ward or hospital that are genetically similar to a HOCI 
as evidence for nosocomial infection even when they are not plausible transmission sources 
themselves, given the potential for asymptomatic transmission[7-10] and complex transmission 
networks[14]. 
 
The SRT uses a number of heuristic approximations in order to provide an integrated summary 
of epidemiological and sequence data. However, this choice is associated with the limitation that 
it does not provide a full probabilistic model of potential transmission networks. Further 
development of the SRT would also aim to more fully incorporate patient movement data and 
shift locations for HCWs. 
 
Our novel approach to the investigation of HOCIs has shown promising characteristics on 
retrospective application to two clinical datasets. The SRT described allows rapid feedback on 
HOCIs that integrates epidemiological and sequencing data to generate a simplified report at 
the time that sequence data become available. Its prospective use will be evaluated in a 
multicentre trial in late 2020 and early 2021. The methodology has been developed for hospital 
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Tables 
Table 1 Summary of sequence reporting tool outputs for the Glasgow and Sheffield datasets, 
according to standard IPC definitions recommended by PHE regarding likelihood of healthcare-
associated infection (HCAI) 
 Glasgow data Sheffield data 
  IPC classification IPC classification 












n HOCI cases  20  27  78 62 68 71 
Time from admission to 
sample*, days 
 4.5 (3-6)  11 (9-13)  48 (26-83) 5 (4-6) 9 (8-13) 22 (17-31) 
Summary of sequence matches returned for each HOCI case 
Close sequence match on 
ward 
 5 (25.0)  15 (55.6)  53 (68.0) 24 (38.7) 46 (67.6) 46 (64.8) 
No close sequence match 
on ward, but match within 
hospital 
 8 (40.0)  7 (25.9)  19 (24.4) 34 (54.8) 21 (30.9) 21 (29.6) 
No close sequence match 
anywhere within hospital 
 7 (35.0)  5 (18.5)  6 (7.7) 4 (6.5) 1 (1.5) 4 (5.6) 
Close sequence match to 
one or more HCW 
 1 (5.0)  0 (0)  13 (16.7) 55 (88.7) 61 (89.7) 59 (83.1) 
No close sequence match 
anywhere within dataset 
 2 (10.0)  1 (3.7)  4 (5.1) 4 (6.5) 1 (1.5) 4 (5.6) 
Probability calculations 


























Posterior probability of 
HCAI* category 
      
    Low (<30%) 10 (50.0) 4 (14.8) 2 (2.6) 25 (40.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
    Moderately low (≥30% 
& <50%) 
2 (10.0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 12 (19.4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
    Medium (≥50% & 
<70%) 
4 (20.0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (6.5) 5 (7.4) 3 (4.2) 
    High (≥70% & <85%) 3 (15.0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (12.9) 7 (10.3) 2 (2.8) 
    Very high (≥85%) 1 (5.0) 23 (85.2) 76 (97.4) 13 (21.0) 56 (82.4) 66 (93.0) 
Data shown as median (IQR) or n (%). *or first +ve test where known. †Based on time from 
admission. ‡From source on ward or within hospital.  
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Table 2 Summary of distinct outbreak events for the Glasgow and Sheffield datasets, according 
to standard PHE definition and with the addition of sequence data 
 Glasgow data Sheffield data 
n HOCI cases 125 201 
n ward locations 44 38 
   
Sequence matches per HOCI case   
n sequence matches from same ward, 
median (IQR, range) 
1 (0-5, 0-12) 1 (0-4, 0-18) 
n sequence matches from rest of hospital, 
median (IQR, range) 
3 (1-8, 0-52) 27 (5-52, 0-150) 
   
Standard PHE definition of outbreak event    
HOCI cases part of ward outbreak event, n 
(%) 
95 (76.0) 184 (91.5) 
n ward outbreak events 17 24 
n HOCI cases per ward outbreak event, 
median (IQR, range) 
4 (2-8, 2-17) 5 (3.5-10.5, 2-28) 
Days from first to last case in outbreak, 
median (IQR, range) 
8 (6-15, 0-31 ) 18 (13-34, 3-68) 
n wards with more than one distinct outbreak 
event 
0 0 
   
Outbreak events with sequence linkage    
HOCI cases part of ward outbreak event, n 
(%) 
85 (68.0) 140 (69.7) 
n ward outbreak events 16 33 
n HOCI cases per ward outbreak event, 
median (IQR, range) 
3.5 (2-8, 2-16) 3 (2-4, 1-19) 
Days from first to last case in outbreak, 
median (IQR, range) 
6 (4-9, 0-15) 4 (2-8, 0-17) 
n wards with more than one distinct outbreak 
event 
0 9* 
*In three wards there were three genetically distinct outbreak events.  
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Figures 
Figure 1 Plot of the posterior probability of healthcare-associated infection (HCAI) for (a) 
Glasgow and (b) Sheffield HOCIs from the sequence reporting tool algorithm against the prior 
probability of HCAI based only on time from admission to diagnosis, grouped by standard IPC 
classification recommended by PHE. 
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Figure 2 Plot of the posterior probabilities of healthcare-associated infection (HCAI) estimated 
using the sequence reporting tool algorithm from a source on the current ward versus a source 
elsewhere in the hospital for (a) Glasgow and (b) Sheffield HOCIs grouped by standard PHE 
classification. In cases where there are no close sequence matches in the dataset (including 
among community cases), the results returned are based solely on the priors and the metadata; 
this explains the fact that there are some cases with estimated posterior probability of infection 
on the ward greater than 0.5 for whom there were no sequence matches on the ward. 
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Figure 3. Maximum-likelihood phylogeny of the sequences found in Hospital 5 Unit 93 and Unit 
92 up until the 16th of May of the Glasgow dataset. The black lines represent the time from 
admission to sampling. The values below the line are the posterior probability for unit infection + 
the posterior probability of hospital infection from the sequence reporting tool. The tip nodes are 
coloured according to the local authority area of the community surveillance sequences (circles) 
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Figure 4. Maximum-likelihood tree for sequences found in Hospital 2 Unit 48 and Hospital 4 
Unit 69 of the Glasgow dataset up until the 21st of April (inclusive). The circles with numbers 
represent the number of community sequences that are identical and at the base of each 
lineage (n=5, n=35, n=4). Tree tips with black circles represent further community sequences. 
The black lines represent the time from admission to sampling. The values below the line are 
the posterior probability for unit infection + the posterior probability of hospital infection from the 
sequence reporting tool. 
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Figure 5. Maximum-likelihood phylogeny of the sequences found in Location ‘0111’ in the 
Sheffield dataset, also including patients at several other ward locations. The tree tip nodes are 
coloured according to ward locations. The black lines represent the time from admission to 
sampling. The values below the line are the posterior probability for unit infection + the posterior 
probability of hospital infection from the sequence reporting tool.  
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Online-only Supplementary Appendix 
Methods 
 
Details of sequencing protocols 
Glasgow 
Sequencing with ONT followed the protocols developed by the ARTIC network (v1 and v2) 
https://artic.network/ncov-2019. The reads were aligned to the reference strain (MN908947) 
using minimap2 (https://doi.org/10.1093/bioinformatics/bty191) and denoised using nanopolish 
(https://www.nature.com/articles/nmeth.3444) prior to primer trimming and consensus calling 
with iVar  using a minimum depth of 20 reads (https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-018-1618-7). 
Sequencing with Illumina also used the ARTIC network protocol for amplicon generation but 
was followed by a DNA KAPA library preparation kit (Roche) and indexing with NEBNext 
multiplex oligos (NEB) using 7 PCR cycles. Libraries were pooled and loaded on a MiSeqV2 
cartridge. Illumina reads were processed with the PrimalAlign pipeline 
(https://github.com/rjorton/PrimalAlign). Briefly, reads were trimmed using trim_galore 
(https://www.bioinformatics.babraham.ac.uk/projects/trim_galore/) aligned to the reference using 
BWA (10.1093/bioinformatics/btp698). Then, amplicon primers were removed and the 
consensus called with a read depth of 10 using iVar (https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-018-1618-




Sequencing with ONT followed the protocols developed by the ARTIC network (v1 and v2) 
https://artic.network/ncov-2019. Following base calling, data were demultiplexed using ONT 
Guppy using a high accuracy model. Reads were filtered based on quality and length (400 to 
700bp), then mapped to the Wuhan reference genome and primer sites trimmed. Reads were 
then downsampled to 200x coverage in each direction. Variants were called using nanopolish 
(https://github.com/jts/nanopolish) and used to determine changes from the reference. 
Consensus sequences were constructed using reference and variants called. 
 
 
Further details of reference set definitions 
 
Data sources for algorithm 
There are two potential sources of data for the HOCI classification algorithm. Firstly, there are 
institution-sampled sequences: these include all viral sequences from samples obtained within 
the institution/hospital. These sequences are linked to meta-data providing basic information 
regarding the patient concerned and details of the sample from which the sequence was 
obtained. Secondly, there are community-sampled sequences: these include all relevant 
sequences obtained from samples from testing within the local community. These sequences 
are associated with a more limited set of linked meta-data describing date of sample, residential 
outer postcode of subject and place of work if they are recorded as being a HCW. 
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Unit reference set 
This data set comprises all institution-sampled sequences sampled on or ≤3 weeks prior to (or 
≤2 days after for the prospective version of the SRT) the sample date of the focus sequence 
and for which both the institution and the unit is the same as that for the focus sequence. 
 
Institution reference set 
This data set comprises firstly all institution-sampled sequences from HCWs, outpatients and 
inpatients diagnosed >48 h after admission for which the institution matches that of the focus 
sequence sampled on or ≤3 weeks prior to (or ≤2 days after for the prospective version of the 
SRT) the sample date of the focus sequence and for which the unit is either not the same as 
that for the focus sequence or is missing. Secondly, the data set includes all institution-sampled 
sequences from A&E patients or inpatients diagnosed ≤2 days after admission for which the 
institutionID matches that of the focus sequence sampled between (inclusively) 3 weeks and 3 
days prior to the sample date of the focus sequence and for which the unit is either not the 
same as that for the focus sequence or is missing. Thirdly, this data set also includes the subset 
of community-sampled sequences of healthcare workers at the same institution as the focus 
sequence. 
 
Community reference set 
This data set comprises firstly all community-sampled sequences sampled on or ≤6 weeks prior 
to (or ≤2 days after for the prospective version of the SRT) the sample date of the focus 
sequence. This data set also includes institution-sampled sequences sampled on or ≤6 weeks 
prior to (or ≤2 days after for the prospective version of the SRT) the sample date of the focus 
sequence from all non-inpatient samples, and those inpatients for whom sample date and 
symptom onset date (if recorded) are both ≤2 days after the admission date. 
 
 
Note that some institution-sampled sequences will contribute to both the community reference 
set and either the unit reference set or the institution reference set (e.g. outpatients sampled 
within 3 weeks prior to the focus sequence would be included in both the community reference 
set and the institution reference set). HCWs recorded among the community-sampled 
sequences within ≤3 weeks prior to the sample date of the focus sequence will also be included 
in both the community reference set and the institution reference set if their workplace matches 
the institution of the focus sequence. 
 
Formulae for probability calculations 
Posterior of unit-acquired infection (UI) = 
          2	
 |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 |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Posterior of institution-acquired infection (II) =   
    1           2	
 |
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Posterior of visitor-acquired infection (VI) =  
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Posterior of community-acquired infection (CI) =  
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When there is a close sequence match found in any of the defined reference sets, the posterior 
probability estimates for UI, II, VI and CI will always sum to 1. However, when there is no close 
sequence match in any of the reference sets the posterior probability calculations are not valid 
and the algorithm will return the prior probabilities for each potential source/location of infection. 
 
Further details regarding sequence matching process 
The ±2 SNP threshold for a close sequence match was initially based on reports of healthcare-
associated outbreak events for which this was the maximum pairwise difference within clusters 
(Meredith: DOI:10.1101/2020.05.08.20095687 & Rockett: DOI: 10.1101/2020.04.19.048751). 
The outbreak events described included sequences with up to around 3 weeks between first 
and last samples. This SNP threshold is also supported by calculations using the overall 
mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2. If we take the average mutation rate of the virus to be 24 
SNPs/year (Nextstrain value 24th June, https://nextstrain.org/ncov/global?l=clock), then 
assuming independent (Poisson distributed) mutation events, ignoring the chance of mutations 
occurring at the same position in the genome and using a fixed generation time of 5 days then 
there is an approximate: 
72% chance of no new SNPs per generation 
24% chance of 1 new SNP per generation 
4% chance of 2 new SNPs per generation 
0.4% chance of 3 new SNPs per generation 
 
A 2 SNP threshold would therefore be expected to identify close sequence matches between 
direct transmission pairs in a large majority of cases. Ambiguous nucleotide positions will be 
considered to match if there is an overlap in the possible values for the two sequences. ‘N’ 
values recorded in either the focus sequence or comparison sequence will be considered to be 
a match at that position. 
 
 
Further details of prior probability calculations for post-admission infection 
 
We calculate Pprior= F(t), where F() is the cumulative distribution function of a published log-
normal distribution for incubation times (Lauer et al: doi:10.7326/M20-0504; 
μ=1.621, σ=0.418). For symptomatic HOCI cases, the IPC classifications recommended by PHE 
translate into the following value ranges for Pprior: 
● indeterminate HCAI: 0.11 (onset 3 days post-admission) to 0.78 (onset 7 days 
post-admission) 
● probable HCAI: 0.86 (onset 8 days post-admission) to 0.99 (onset 14 days post-
admission) 
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● definite HCAI: Pprior≥0.995 
 
For asymptomatic focus cases, we define our prior on the basis that some proportion of the 
cases detected will never become symptomatic (Pa) with the remainder going on to develop 
symptoms within the next few days (1-Pa). We then define our prior probability of post-admission 
infection in these cases as: 
 
    1     	
         	
  
 
where t is the interval from admissionDate to sampleDate and c is a constant reflecting the 
average interval within which we expect symptoms to appear (among those cases in which they 
do). Pa is set at 0.4 based on the findings of a published review article (Oran and Topol: 
doi.org/10.7326/M20-3012), and c is set to 3 based on a combination of expert opinion of the 
study PIs, the known distribution of time from infection to symptom onset and expert experience 
of asymptomatic screening. 
 
Source given post-admission infection 
The model requires prior values for the probability of UI and VI given post-admission infection: 
Pu and Pv, respectively. However, in specifying the model we define Pu’ as the probability of UI 
given post-admission infection when there are no visitors allowed on the ward, in which case the 
probability of VI is zero and Pv’=0. If visitors are allowed on the ward for the focus case, then we 
set Pu= Pu’×(1-Pv). 
 
Based on expert opinion of the clinical co-coauthors, Pu’ is set to different values according to 
the unit/ward type of the focus sequence with single bed wards having a lower prior probability 
of unit post-admission infection than bay wards: 0.5 for single bed wards and 0.7 for bay wards. 
We assumed a Pv of 0.2. The Pu values (when visitors are allowed) are therefore: 0.4 for single 
bed wards and 0.56 for bay wards. The largest of the three Glasgow hospitals included 
comprises single-room wards, whilst the other two and the Sheffield site comprise bay wards. 
 
Derivation of prior probability for post-admission infection 
If we assume a uniform individual-level hazard (λ) of infection from 1st February 2020 (t0), 
whether in hospital or not, then the probability density function (PDF) of infection at time tinf from 
this date is: λe^(-λtinf). The PDF of infection at time tinf conditional on this occurring at any point 
prior to the date of symptom onset (tonset) is: (λe^(-λtinf)) / (1-e^(-λtpos)), which is approximately 
1/tonset for small λ (taking the limit as λ->0). For HOCI cases, we are interested in whether tinf 
occurred before or after the time of admission to hospital (tadm). Also considering the evidence 
provided by the known incubation time of the disease (PDF f and CDF F), we integrate over the 
range of possible infection dates: 
       |     	
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Geographic weighting for community reference set 
Geographic weighting function 
The weight of each sequence within the community reference set is determined by geographic 
distance from the residential outer postcode of the focus case, using a function of the form: 
weight= (1-β)*exp(-τ*communityDistanceToIndex[i]) + β, 
where, β takes a value between 0 and 1, and τ>0. These parameters are set based on 
calibration to the available community reference set at each site. The rationale for this weighting 
is that there is likely to be geographic clustering of viral lineages, and so newly observed 
community transmissions of SARS-CoV-2 are more likely to show genetic similarity to past 
sequences from the local area of that individual’s home than to past sequences from regions 
that are further away. If postcode is missing for a case in the community reference set, then 
distance to the focus sequence is set to 100 km.  
 
 
Statistical model for derivation of geographic weighting parameters  
The statistical model for geographic weighting is fitted separately for each study site using 
sequences which are strongly thought to represent community-acquired infection: all 
community-sampled sequences and patients presenting to A&E with COVID-19, excluding 
those who are recorded as being healthcare workers or who do not have an available valid 
outer postcode. We will refer to these sequences as the ‘calibration set’. 
 
A statistical model is constructed to find the optimal values of β and τ to maximise the estimated 
probability (Psim:i) of a newly observed community-acquired case having a similar sequence 
(±2SNPs) to that observed for each sequence in the calibration set. The estimated probability in 
each case within the calibration set is calculated as a weighted sum of ‘close match’ indicator 
variables for all other sequences in the calibration set sample from 6 weeks prior up until the 
sample date of that case, with the weighting function defined in terms of geographic distance 
between residential outer postcodes and the β and τ parameters as described for the 
community reference set. 
 
An overall log-likelihood function is defined using a Bernoulli distribution for each of the n 
sequences within the calibration set: 
ℓ  ∑  :

 . 
The values of β and τ that maximise ℓ were obtained for each of the study sites using the 
‘bbmle’ package for R, with logit-parameterisation of β and log-parameterisation of τ. 
 
We assume that the probability of a sequence match conditional on infection from visitor on 
unit/ward can be calculated using the same weighting scheme as for the probability of a 
sequence match conditional on community-acquired infection (i.e.  P(seq±2 
SNPs|CI)==P(seq±2 SNPs|VI)). 
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Additional matching on ward location history 
There is the potential for the algorithm described to return large numbers of close sequences 
matches with the hospital as a whole, which may make it difficult for IPC teams to use the 
output to direct their investigations when there are no potential sources of infection identified on 
the same ward as the focus case. We propose a location matching procedure in order to 
highlight the most relevant sequence matches for further investigation. This process does not 
currently form part of the statistical model, meaning that it can be treated as optional 
functionality for the SRT in the COG-UK HOCI study, and we have restricted the input data to a 
simplified format in order to minimise data management requirements. 
 
For each inpatient sample in the input meta-data for the algorithm, we specify a single string 
variable comprising the concatenated names of any ward locations in the ≤14 days prior to the 
sample date and a separate string variable with any ward locations in the ≤14 days after the 
sample date. For each focus case submitted to the algorithm, output is flagged if there is any 
match identified between the wards listed in each of these fields or the ward at time of sampling 
for a close sequence match in comparison to the prior and current ward locations for the focus 
sequence (excluding those cases were there is already matching ward location at time of 
sampling for each). 
 
Details of phylogenetic methods 
Phylogenies were produced by the grapevine pipeline (https://github.com/COG-UK/grapevine) 
as part of the COG-UK Consortium (https://www.cogconsortium.uk). Briefly, sequences from 
GISAID and those produced as part of the COG-UK Consortium are independently quality 
controlled and aligned to the Wuhan reference using minimap2 
(https://doi.org/10.1093/bioinformatics/bty191). The two alignments are then combined, the 
homoplasy at site 11083 is masked and the tree is reconstructed using FastTreeMP 
(http://www.microbesonline.org/fasttree/). For each of the hospitals of interest, the tree is pruned 
to keep sequences from Scotland or Yorkshire (as relevant) and by date excluding sequences 
subsequent to the last “focus” patient sample date on the ward. 
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Details of SRT report format 
The SRT system for prospective use needs to provide useful and appropriate feedback in both 
low incidence and high incidence settings for new HOCI cases. This is planned through the 
generation of a concise one-page PDF summary report for each focus sequence. This summary 
report will contain key focus sequence meta-data, information regarding the estimated 
probabilities for infection source and details of up to ten close sequence matches identified 
within the same unit/ward and/or elsewhere in the hospital. 
 
Probability summary categories 
The sequence matching and probability score algorithm generates probability estimates for the 
source of infection for the focus patient being from the current unit/ward, from elsewhere in the 
hospital, from the community (pre-admission) or from a visitor. These probability estimates 
always sum to 1. In the summary report, probability estimates for each source of infection are 
categorised using the following levels: 
● 0-30%: low 
● 30-50%: moderately low 
● 50-70%: probable 
● 70-85%: high 
● 85-100%: very high 
 
For clarity of presentation and communication, probability categories will not always be 
displayed in the summary report for all four potential sources of infection (i.e. ward/unit, 
elsewhere in hospital, visitor, or community). Special handling rules for specific situations are 
described below. 
 
Close sequence matches within the same unit and/or hospital 
The maximum number of close sequence matches that can be listed on the one-page summary 
report is 10 (for the combined sum of unit-level and institution-level matches). If the number of 
ward-level matches is n>5 and the total number of close sequence matches is N>10, then the 
number of ward-level matches is truncated at 5+max((5-(N-n)),0). If there are over ten close 
sequence matches in total, then the following message is displayed "Over 10 close matches; 
see detailed report for further information". 
 
Within the each the sets of unit-level and institution-level close sequence matches, ordering and 
priority for inclusion within the available slots is determined by the following set of criteria (in 
decreasing order of importance): 
1. Number of SNPs relative to Wuhan strain present in comparison sequence but absent in 
focus sequence (fewer = higher priority) 
2. Number of SNPs relative to Wuhan strain present in focus sequence but absent in 
comparison sequence (fewer = higher priority) 
3. Whether comparison sequence is from a HCW (HCWs listed first) 
4. HCAI status of comparison sequence (priority order: definite, probable, indeterminate, 
otherwise) 
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5. Samples from the past before samples in future 
6. Samples from within the two weeks prior to focus sequence sample date before others 
7. Number of units overlapping with focus sample's units 
 
 
Report messages for specific output combinations 
 
No close sequence matches on unit/ward 
If there are no close sequence matches to the focus sequence on their current unit/ward, then 
no probability category is reported for this potential infection source (the algorithm returns a zero 
probability in such cases, which could be misleading given uncertainty over screening and 
sequencing coverage). The message "No matches from within unit" is displayed. The probability 
score category for infection from elsewhere in the hospital is provided in such cases. 
 
No close sequence matches elsewhere in hospital 
If there are no close sequence matches to the focus sequence elsewhere in the hospital, then 
no probability category is reported for this potential infection source. The message "No matches 
elsewhere in hospital" is displayed. 
 
No evidence of transmission within unit or hospital for probable or definite HCAI 
If the estimated probability of community-acquired infection from the algorithm is >50%, but the 
interval from admission to symptom onset (if recorded) or sample date is ≥8 days, then the 
following message is displayed in place of the estimated probability of community-acquired 
infection "This is a probable/definite HCAI based on admission date, but we have not found 
genetic evidence of transmission within the hospital". 
 
Probable unit- or hospital-acquired infection with source unclear 
If the posterior probability of unit-acquired infection and the posterior probability of infection from 
a source elsewhere in the hospital are each estimated to be <50%, but the sum of these two 
posterior probabilities is ≥50%, then the following message is displayed "Overall, this is a 
probable unit- or institution-acquired infection with source unclear". 
 
Timeline graph 
The timeline graph provides a visual representation of available sequences from the same 
unit/ward and the same institution/hospital as the focus sequence in the period from 3 weeks 
prior to their sample date to 1 week after. The key indicates which sequences are close 
matches to the focus sequence, and the numbering corresponds to that in the tabular summary 
of most relevant close sequence matches.  
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Results 
 
Sequencing coverage in Glasgow dataset 
 
Figure S1 Proportion of cases sequenced in Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board between 
1 March and 27th May (with sequence available as of 23 June 2020) by location of test (A). Also 
displayed are the proportion of sequenced cases in the three focus hospitals subdivided by 
assessment and inpatient locations (B), and the proportion of HOCI cases sequenced at these 
hospitals (C). 
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Home residence locations and geographic model parameters 
 
Figure S2 Home residence location of individuals in (a) the Glasgow dataset and (b) the 
Sheffield dataset, displayed by sample source (not including HCWs). Locations are analysed 
using only the outer postcode, and as such random jitter (within longitude and latitude of 0.05) 
has been added to allow display without overlap of points. Plot created using ggmap for R with 
map obtained from Stamen maps. For Glasgow 766 cases were included in the calibration set 
with estimates of τ=0.15 and β=0.0 for the geographic clustering model, whilst for Sheffield 446 
cases were included in the calibration set with resulting estimates of τ=0.84 and β=0.16.
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SNP distance distributions 
For the Glasgow sequence dataset as a whole the median pairwise SNP difference among all 
sequences was 9, and there were 1.3%, 3.4%, 6.4% and 10.1% of pairwise comparisons with 0, 
≤1, ≤2 and ≤3 SNP differences, respectively. For the Sheffield dataset as a whole the median 
pairwise SNP difference among all sequences was 8, and there were 1.2%, 3.3%, 6.5% and 
10.8% of pairwise comparisons with 0, ≤1, ≤2 and ≤3 SNP differences, respectively. 
 
 
Figure S3  Frequency plot of all pairwise SNP differences among (a) all 1199 sequences in the 
Glasgow dataset and (b) all 1629 analysed sequences in the Sheffield dataset. 
 
  
 . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted November 15, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.11.12.20230326doi: medRxiv preprint 
Examples of SRT reports 
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The COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) consortium 
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Carlos E Balcazar PhD 19, Angela Beckett MSc 68 Robert Beer BSc 36 ,  Dr Gilberto 
Betancor PhD76,  Emma Betteridge 1 , Dr David Bibby 7 , Dr Daniel Bradshaw 7 ,  
Catherine Bresner Bsc(Hons) 34, Dr Hannah E Bridgewater PhD 71 , Alice Broos BSc (Hons) 21 , 
Dr Rebecca Brown PhD 38 , Dr Paul E Brown PhD 71, Dr Kirstyn Brunker PhD 22 , Dr Stephen N 
Carmichael PhD 21 , Jeffrey K. J. Cheng MSc 71, Dr Rachel Colquhoun DPhil 19 , Dr Gavin 
Dabrera 7 , Dr Johnny Debebe PhD 54, Eleanor Drury 1, Dr Louis du Plessis 24 , Richard Eccles 
MSc 46, Dr Nicholas Ellaby 7, Audrey Farbos MSc 49, Ben Farr 1 ,Dr Jacqueline Findlay PhD 41 , 
Chloe L Fisher MSc 74, Leysa Marie Forrest MSc 41, Dr Sarah Francois 24, Lucy R. Frost BSc 71, 
William Fuller BSc 34 , Dr Eileen Gallagher 7 , Dr Michael D Gallagher PhD19 , Matthew Gemmell 
MSc 46, Dr Rachel AJ Gilroy PhD 51, Scott Goodwin 1, Dr Luke R Green PhD 38 ,Dr Richard 
Gregory PhD 46 ,Dr Natalie Groves 7 ,Dr James W Harrison PhD 49, Hassan Hartman 7 , Dr 
Andrew R Hesketh PhD93,Verity Hill 19, Dr Jonathan Hubb 7 ,Dr Margaret Hughes PhD46 ,Dr 
David K Jackson 1 ,Dr Ben Jackson PhD 19 ,Dr Keith James 1 ,Natasha Johnson BSc (Hons)21 
,Ian Johnston 1, Jon-Paul Keatley 1, Dr Moritz Kraemer 24, Dr Angie Lackenby 7, Dr Mara 
Lawniczak 1 , Dr David Lee 7, Rich Livett 1, Stephanie Lo 1, Daniel Mair BSc (Hons) 21, Joshua 
Maksimovic FD sport science 36, Nikos Manesis 7 ,Dr Robin Manley Ph.D 49, Dr Carmen Manso 7 
,Dr Angela Marchbank BSc 34 ,Dr Inigo Martincorena 1 ,Dr Tamyo Mbisa 7, Kathryn McCluggage 
MSC 36,Dr JT McCrone PhD 19, Shahjahan Miah 7 , Michelle L Michelsen BSc 49 , Dr Mari 
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Morgan PhD 33, Dr Gaia Nebbia PhD, FRCPath 78,Charlotte Nelson MSc 46 ,Jenna Nichols BSc 
(Hons) 21 ,Dr Paola Niola PhD 41 ,Dr Kyriaki Nomikou PhD21 ,Steve Palmer 1 , Dr. Naomi Park 1, 
Dr Yasmin A Parr PhD21 ,Dr Paul J Parsons PhD 38 , Vineet Patel 7 ,Dr. Minal Patel 1 ,Clare 
Pearson MSc 2, 1 ,Dr Steven Platt 7 ,Christoph Puethe 1, Dr. Mike Quail 1,Dr JaynaRaghwani 24 , 
Dr Lucille Rainbow PhD 46 ,Shavanthi Rajatileka 1 ,Dr Mary Ramsay 7 ,Dr Paola C Resende 
Silva PhD 41, 42, Steven Rudder 51, Dr Chris Ruis 3 ,Dr Christine M Sambles PhD 49 ,Dr Fei Sang 
PhD 54 ,Dr Ulf Schaefer7 ,Dr Emily Scher PhD 19 ,Dr. Carol Scott 1 ,Lesley Shirley 1, Adrian W 
Signell BSc 76 ,John Sillitoe 1 ,Christen Smith 1 ,Dr Katherine L Smollett PhD 21 ,Karla Spellman 
FD 36 ,Thomas D Stanton BSc 19 ,Dr David J Studholme  PhD 49 ,Ms Grace Taylor-Joyce BSc 71 
,Dr Ana P Tedim PhD 51 ,Dr Thomas Thompson PhD6 ,Dr Nicholas M Thomson PhD 51 ,Scott 
Thurston1 ,Lily Tong PhD 21 ,Gerry Tonkin-Hill 1, Rachel M Tucker MSc 38 , Dr Edith E Vamos 
PhD 4,Dr Tetyana Vasylyeva24 , Joanna Warwick-Dugdale BSc 49 , Danni Weldon 1 ,Dr Mark 
Whitehead PhD 46 ,Dr David Williams 7,Dr Kathleen A Williamson PhD19,Harry D Wilson BSc 
76,Trudy Workman HNC 34 ,Dr Muhammad Yasir PhD 51, Dr Xiaoyu Yu PhD 19, and Dr Alex 
Zarebski 24.   
  
Samples and logistics:        
Dr Evelien M Adriaenssens PhD 51, Dr Shazaad S Y Ahmad MSc 2, 47 , Adela Alcolea-Medina 
MPharm 59, 77 ,Dr John Allan PhD60, Dr Patawee Asamaphan PhD21, Laura Atkinson MSc 40,  
Paul Baker MD 63, Professor Jonathan Ball PhD 55, Dr Edward Barton MD64, Dr. Mathew A 
Beale1, Dr. Charlotte Beaver1 , Dr Andrew Beggs PhD16, Dr Andrew Bell PhD51, Duncan J 
Berger 1, Dr Louise Berry. 56, Claire M Bewshea MSc 49, Kelly Bicknell 70, Paul Bird 58, Dr Chloe 
Bishop 7 , Dr Tim Boswell 56, Cassie Breen BSc48, Dr Sarah K Buddenborg1, Dr Shirelle Burton-
Fanning MD 66, Dr Vicki Chalker 7, Dr Joseph G Chappell PhD 55, Themoula Charalampous MSc 
78, 94, Claire Cormie3, Dr Nick Cortes PhD29, 25, Dr Lindsay J Coupland PhD 52, Angela Cowell 
MSc48 , Dr Rose K Davidson PhD 53 , Joana Dias MSc3 , Dr Maria Diaz PhD51 , Thomas Dibling1, 
Matthew J Dorman1, Dr Nichola Duckworth57, Scott Elliott70,  Sarah Essex63, Karlie Fallon 58 , 
Theresa Feltwell 8  , Dr Vicki M  Fleming PhD 56, Sally Forrest BSc 3, Luke Foulser1, Maria V 
Garcia-Casado1, Dr Artemis Gavriil PhD 41, Dr Ryan P George PhD47, Laura Gifford MSc 33, 
Harmeet K Gill PhD3, Jane Greenaway MSc65, Luke Griffith Bsc53, Ana Victoria Gutierrez51, Dr 
Antony D Hale MBBS85, Dr Tanzina Haque FRCPath, PhD91, Katherine L Harper MBiol85, Dr Ian 
Harrison 7 , Dr Judith Heaney PhD89, Thomas Helmer 58, Ellen E Higginson PhD 3 , Richard 
Hopes 2, Dr Hannah C Howson-Wells PhD 56, Dr Adam D Hunter 1, Robert Impey 70, Dr Dianne 
Irish-Tavares FRCPath 91, David A Jackson1 , Kathryn A Jackson MSc 46 , Dr Amelia Joseph 56, 
Leanne Kane 1, Sally Kay 1, Leanne M Kermack MSc 3, Manjinder Khakh 56, Dr Stephen P Kidd 
PhD29, 25,31, , Dr Anastasia Kolyva PhD 51, Jack CD Lee BSc 40, Laura Letchford 1 , Nick Levene 
MSc79, Dr LisaJ Levett PhD 89, Dr Michelle M Lister PhD 56, Allyson Lloyd 70 , Dr Joshua Loh 
PhD60 , Dr Louissa R Macfarlane-Smith PhD85, Dr Nicholas W Machin MSc 2 , 47, Mailis Maes 
M.phil3, Dr Samantha McGuigan 1, Liz McMinn 1, Dr Lamia Mestek-Boukhibar D.Phil 41, Dr 
Zoltan Molnar PhD 6, Lynn Monaghan 79, Dr Catrin Moore 27, Plamena Naydenova BSc 3, 
Alexandra S Neaverson 1, Dr. Rachel Nelson PhD 1, Marc O Niebel MSc21 , Elaine O'Toole BSc 
48 , Debra Padgett BSc 64, Gaurang Patel 1 , Dr Brendan AI Payne MD 66, Liam Prestwood 1, Dr 
Veena Raviprakash MD67, Nicola Reynolds PhD86 Dr Alex Richter PhD 16, Dr Esther Robinson 
PhD95, Dr Hazel A Rogers1, Dr Aileen Rowan PhD 96, Garren Scott BSc 64, Dr Divya Shah 
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PhD40, Nicola Sheriff BSc 67, Dr Graciela Sluga MD - MSc92 , Emily Souster1, Dr. Michael 
Spencer-Chapman1, Sushmita Sridhar BSc1, 3, Tracey Swingler 53, Dr Julian Tang58, Professor 
Graham P Taylor DSc96, Dr Theocharis Tsoleridis PhD55, Dr Lance Turtle PhD MRCP46, Dr 
Sarah Walsh 57, Dr Michelle Wantoch PhD 86, Joanne Watts BSc48 , Dr Sheila Waugh MD66, 
Sam Weeks41, Dr Rebecca Williams BMBS 31, Dr Iona Willingham56,  Dr Emma L Wise PhD 25, 
29, 31,  Victoria Wright BSc 54, Dr Sarah Wyllie 70 ,  and Jamie Young BSc 3. 
 
Software and analysis tools        
Amy Gaskin MSc33, Dr Will Rowe PhD 15, and Dr Igor Siveroni PhD96.  
 
Visualisation:       
Dr Robert Johnson PhD 96.  
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